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Tax compliance involves a decision where personal benefits come at the expense of
society and its members. We explored the roles of procedural and distributive justice and
citizens’ perceptions of the tax authority’s power in stimulating voluntary tax compliance.
Distributive and procedural justice have often (but not always) been shown to interact
in such a way that high distributive justice or high procedural justice is sufficient to
predict positive responses to authorities and the social collective they represent. We
examined whether this interaction predicts voluntary (but not enforced) tax compliance,
in particular among citizens who perceive the tax authority’s power as high (vs. low).
The results of two field studies among Ethiopian (Study 1) and United States (Study
2) taxpayers supported our predictions. With this research we connect the roles of two
core social psychological antecedents of tax compliance (i.e., distributive and procedural
justice) with that of a deterrent factor (i.e., authority power) and obtain support for
the psychological process underlying the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction in two diverging tax environments.
Keywords: distributive justice, procedural justice, power, voluntary tax compliance, deterrence
INTRODUCTION
Complying with tax laws and regulations involves a dilemma where personal gains that result from
non-compliance come at a cost for society and its members (Kaplan et al., 1997; Chung and Trivedi,
2003; McGee, 2006; Maciejovsky et al., 2012; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Dowling, 2014; Gangl et al.,
2015). This dilemma facing taxpayers has captured the attention of scholars from various disciplines
for at least half a century (see Kirchler, 2007 for an overview). As part of their scientific investigation
into tax compliance, social psychologists have identified various factors that predict the decision
to voluntarily comply with taxation laws and regulations (i.e., voluntary tax compliance). Two of
the most important antecedents of voluntary tax compliance that research has identified are the
distributive justice of the tax authority (e.g., Cowell, 1992; Wenzel, 2002, 2003; Saad, 2011) and the
procedural justice of this authority (Hartner et al., 2008; Farrar, 2015).
Surprisingly, very few researchers have considered if (and when) these two justice dimensions
may interact to predict voluntary tax compliance (see Farrar and Thorne, 2012, for the only
exception that we know of). This is despite the investigation of the Distributive Justice× Procedural
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Justice interaction effect on responses to authorities (e.g., trust
in the authority; Brockner et al., 1995) and social systems (e.g.,
organizational commitment; Brockner et al., 1994) in social and
applied psychology (see Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996 for an
overview). Specifically, the interactive effect of distributive and
procedural justice on responses to authorities and the social
collectives that they represent often takes a form in which
high distributive justice or high procedural justice is enough to
lead to constructive responses to the authority or the collective
(i.e., a substituting interaction). Put differently, less constructive
responses are most likely to result when distributive justice and
procedural justice are both low. In the present research we test if
distributive and procedural justice interact in a substituting way
to predict voluntary tax compliance.
More important from a theoretical perspective, we identify
a novel, theoretically relevant moderator of the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction on voluntary tax
compliance. Specifically, we argue that distributive and
procedural justice interact in a substituting way to predict
voluntary compliance more strongly when the authority’s power
is perceived as being high, rather than low. Although the majority
of prior research that studied procedural and distributive justice
simultaneously has obtained the above described substituting
interaction (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996), some studies
failed to reveal it (Dipboye and de Pontbriand, 1981; Tyler
and Caine, 1981; De Cremer et al., 2010; Bianchi et al.,
2015). In fact, in the only study that tested if distributive
and procedural justice interactively influence voluntary tax
compliance, Farrar and Thorne (2012) found no evidence for
this prediction. By focusing on the moderating role of authority
power (and effectively testing a three-way interaction between
authority power, distributive justice, and procedural justice),
the present research aims to identify when the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction is more (vs. less) likely to
predict voluntary tax compliance.
Furthermore, by identifying authority power as a relevant
moderator of the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction on voluntary tax compliance, our research presents
a direct test of the process that drives this interaction effect
(Spencer et al., 2005; MacKinnon and Fairchild, 2009; Jacoby
and Sassenberg, 2011). The Distributive Justice × Procedural
Justice interaction effect on responses to authorities and the
collective is often explained as resulting from a concern to assess
whether authorities will abuse their power (Chen et al., 2003;
Blader and Chen, 2011; Bianchi et al., 2015). Such concerns
of power abuse should be less salient when the authority has
low (rather than high) power. This is why we expect that the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction predicts
voluntary compliance more strongly when the authority’s power
is perceived as high, rather than low.
This research makes three contributions to the literature.
First, taxpayers often perceive distributive justice as low. They
may, for instance, feel that they do not enjoy the benefits of
tax-funded public goods and services as much as they think
they deserve, or they may view that they pay too much in
taxes, while receiving insufficient returns on their tax money
compared with other taxpayers (Alm et al., 1993; Trivedi et al.,
2003; Wenzel, 2003; Bobek et al., 2007; Saad, 2011; Fjeldstad
et al., 2012; Alon and Hageman, 2013; Dowling, 2014). We
test if high (vs. low) procedural justice may counteract or
buffer the undermining effect of low (vs. high) distributive
justice on voluntary tax compliance. Second, the interaction
between distributive and procedural justice has been shortlisted
as a highly relevant conceptual and empirical contribution to
the justice literature (Colquitt et al., 2005). By identifying a
novel boundary condition – citizens’ perceptions of the tax
authority’s power – to its effectiveness, this research clarifies
why these two types of justice interact. Third, almost all tax
compliance research has focused on developed nations (i.e.,
the United States, Europe, and Australia), with developing
countries being neglected. Yet, tax environments in developing
countries differ from those in developed nations. In developing
countries taxpayers tend to view paying taxes as a burden,
rather than a contribution to a common good, and authorities
have low trust in taxpayers (i.e., “cops and robbers” taxation
environments; Kirchler et al., 2008; Asaminew, 2010; Gobena
and van Dijke, 2016). In developed countries, relations between
taxpayers and tax authorities are often more harmonious
(Hansen et al., 1992; Hume et al., 1999; Trivedi et al.,
2003; McGee, 2006; Alm and Torgler, 2011; Maciejovsky
et al., 2012; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Alon and Hageman,
2013; Bobek et al., 2013). We contribute to the ecological
validity of tax compliance research by testing our predictions
in both a developed and a developing country (i.e., the
United States and Ethiopia).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice,
and Voluntary Tax Compliance
Distributive justice refers to the extent to which outcomes of
a process that distributes rewards and burdens are perceived
as matching implicit norms such as the equity rule (Adams,
1965; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Verboon and van Dijke, 2007).
The equity rule requires that individuals should receive benefits
proportional to their contributions. Research has shown that
individuals react in more positive ways when they perceive
decision outcomes as fair (vs. unfair; e.g., Brockner, 2002; Bianchi
et al., 2015). More specific to tax compliance research, studies
have shown that citizens who perceive the distribution of tax
burdens and benefits across individuals, groups, and society as a
whole as fair show as a result more willing to voluntarily comply
with tax laws and regulations (e.g., Wenzel, 2002, 2003; Verboon
and Goslinga, 2009; Saad, 2011).
Focusing on distributive justice is insufficient to understand
the behavior of members of social collectives. In particular, it is
also relevant to consider the fairness of the procedures that are
applied by authorities in enacting rules, resolving disputes, and
allocating resources (i.e., procedural justice; Thibaut and Walker,
1975; Leventhal, 1980). Various factors affect the perceived
fairness of procedures. Some of these factors include consistent
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application of the procedures across time, absence of decision-
makers’ self-interest in the process, decisions being based on
accurate information, and allowing decision recipients to voice
their opinions in the decision-making processes (Thibaut and
Walker, 1975; Leventhal, 1980; van den Bos et al., 1996).
Authorities’ procedural justice is known to beget positive
attitudes and cooperative behaviors from followers (Thibaut and
Walker, 1975; Tyler and Blader, 2000). Some examples of such
effects of procedural justice in various settings include rule-
following (e.g., Tyler, 2009), and public support for police (e.g.,
Jason and Tyler, 2003). Tax compliance studies also show that
citizens who perceive decisions enacted by the tax authority
as high in procedural justice show as a result an increased
willingness to voluntary compliance with tax regulations and laws
(Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy and Tyler, 2008; Farrar, 2015).
However, scholars have recognized that distributive justice
and procedural justice should not be studied in isolation,
but rather as interactive predictors of responses to authorities
and the system they represent (e.g., Brockner and Wiesenfeld,
1996). The often-obtained Distributive Justice × Procedural
Justice interaction has been interpreted in different ways.
Some researchers emphasized that procedural justice more
strongly influences peoples’ reactions to a decision when
distributive justice is low (vs. high; e.g., Shapiro, 1991). Others
emphasized that distributive justice more strongly predicts
individuals’ reactions when procedural justice is low (vs. high;
e.g., Brockner et al., 1994). Both ways of zooming in on the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction imply, as
noted, that high distributive justice or high procedural justice
is sufficient to produce constructive responses to the authority
or the social collective. Put differently, negative responses are
most likely to result when distributive justice and procedural
justice are both low.
The effect of the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction on responses to authorities and the collective they
represent is often explained as resulting from a concern about
possible abuse of power by the enacting authority (Chen et al.,
2003; Blader and Chen, 2011; Bianchi et al., 2015). To evaluate
the likelihood that the authorities will abuse their power, people
examine distributive justice as well as procedural justice. High
distributive or high procedural justice is generally sufficient to
lead people to believe that the authority will not abuse his/her
power. As a result, the presence of high distributive justice or high
procedural justice is enough to promote constructive reactions
toward the authority or the collective.
The Role of Power
In the tax compliance context, power of the tax authorities is
defined as “tax authorities’ capacity to detect and punish tax
crimes” (Wahl et al., 2010, p. 385; see also Kirchler et al., 2008).
Empirical research on the effects of the power of tax authorities
focused on detection probabilities (e.g., Phillips, 2014), fines (e.g.,
Cebula, 2014), and audits (e.g., Bernasconi et al., 2014).
In this paper, we argue that the power of the tax authority
is a meaningful element of the process underlying the effect
of the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction
on voluntary tax compliance. As noted, the effect of the
Distributive Justice× Procedural Justice interaction on responses
to authorities and the collective is often explained as resulting
from a concern to assess whether the authority will abuse his
or her power (Chen et al., 2003; Blader and Chen, 2011; Bianchi
et al., 2015). Specifically, to make sense of whether the authority
can be trusted not to abuse power, people examine distributive
justice as well as procedural justice. As noted, high distributive
or high procedural justice is generally sufficient to make
people believe that the authority will not abuse his/her power.
Therefore, we expect that the Distributive Justice × Procedural
Justice interaction materializes in particular when the enacting
authority’s power is perceived as high (vs. low). This results
because citizens who perceive the authority’s power as high
will have salient concerns about the authority abusing his/her
power. When the authority’s power is low, such concerns are less
likely to be salient.
As first support for this argument, Chen et al. (2003) and
Blader and Chen (2011) found that the typically observed
interaction between distributive and procedural justice where
high distributive or high procedural justice is enough to produce
constructive responses is not found in relationships where justice
is enacted by a partner of lower status or rank. Unfortunately, it
is not clear whether this effect resulted from fear of power abuse,
because rank differences can be based on a number of variables
besides power, most notably status, which is only modestly related
with power (Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Anderson and Brown,
2010). In the present research we offer a direct test of the idea that
the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction results
from concerns about power abuse by considering the power of
the authority as moderator of this interaction. In sum, the above
argument results in our hypothesis:
The tax authority’s power moderates the substituting interaction
effect of distributive and procedural justice of the tax authority
on voluntary tax compliance, such that the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction will be pronounced
when the authority’s power is high (vs. low).
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We tested our hypothesis in two surveys. For Study 1 we
collected data from working professionals in the Ethiopian
capital, Addis Ababa. We used existing, validated scales for all
the variables of our study. In Study 2 we obtained data from
United States taxpayers. Our hypothesis (which we tested in both
studies) concerns the prediction of voluntary tax compliance
by the interaction between distributive and procedural justice
(as further moderated by authority power). For discriminant
validity purposes, we therefore also included enforced tax
compliance. Enforced tax compliance describes the extent to
which citizens comply with tax rules and regulations because
they feel forced to do so (i.e., out of fear of being punished
upon non-compliance; Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al.,
2015; Gobena and van Dijke, 2016). Neither the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction nor the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice × Authority Power interaction
should predict enforced tax compliance.
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We gathered data from 273 working professionals in the
Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, over 3 months (March–May,
2016). Of the respondents, 88% were male and 12% were female.
As for their age categories, 41% were between 20 and 30 years,
41% between 31 and 40, 16% between 41 and 50, 1% between
51 and 60, and 1% above 60. One percent of the respondents
had completed primary education only, 5% had an associate
degree, 52% had a bachelor’s degree, 35% had a master’s degree,
and 7% had completed a Ph.D. Thirty one percent earned
annually between 20,000 and 40,000 Ethiopian Birr, 25% earned
between 40,000 and 60,000 Birr, 8% earned between 60,000
and 80,000 Birr, 20% earned between 80,000 and 100,000 Birr,
5% earned between 100,000 and 120,000 Birr, and 11% earned
more than 120,000 Birr. (1 Birr is about $ 0.05). Asked about
their experiences with the tax authority, 7% of the respondents
reported to have had fewer than 2 years of experience with the
tax authority, 20% had between 2 and 6 years, 35% had between 6
and 10 years, 29% had between 10 and 20 years, and 9% had more
than 20 years of experience. With regard to their ethnicity, 29%
of our respondents reported being Amhara, 16% as Tigray, 34%
as Oromo, 3% as Gurage, and 18% as “other.”
Procedure
We distributed 487 printed questionnaires to respondents. We
also included a cover letter and a postage-paid envelope for
returning the filled-out questionnaire. In the cover letter we
assured strict anonymity of responses and we explained the study
purpose. With a few lagging respondents, assistant data collectors
repeatedly made visits to their offices, and made phone calls
to remind them of the questionnaire (to ensure a reasonable
response rate). The role of the assistant data collectors was
restricted to transferring enclosed, filled-in questionnaires to the
researchers; they could in no way endanger the anonymity of
the respondents. We received 284 filled out questionnaires (a
response rate of 58%). We removed eleven respondents from
the data set because they had skipped a significant number of
items. Consequently, we included data from 273 respondents
in the analyses. The data is available as Supplementary Material.
Measures
All items that we used in this study are included in Appendix.
We used a 5-item scale from Verboon and van Dijke (2007) to
measure the tax authority’s distributive justice. Item examples are
“The use I make of all kinds of social services reflects in a proper
way the taxes I pay” and “Regarding social services I get little
return for my tax money” (reverse coded) (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). We combined these items into an index of
distributive justice.
We measured procedural justice with Colquitt’s (2001) 7-item
scale. This scale was adapted to the tax compliance context by
Gobena and van Dijke (2016, 2017). Item examples (preceded
by the stem “The following items refer to the procedures used
to arrive at tax-related decisions.”) are “Those procedures have
been based on accurate information” and “Those procedures have
been free of bias” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We
combined these items into an index of procedural justice.
We used a 5-item scale from Kastlunger et al. (2013)
to measure the tax authority’s power (see Verboon and van
Dijke, 2007; Siglé et al., 2018, for similar measures of tax
authority’s power). Item examples are “Tax evasion is likely
to be detected” and “Tax authorities control frequently and
profoundly.” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We these
items into an authority power index.
We used a 5-item scale from Kirchler and Wahl (2010) to
measure voluntary tax compliance. Item examples (preceded by
the stem “When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian
tax laws and regulations, I do so. . .”) are “. . .because I like to
contribute to everyone’s good” and “. . .because for me it’s the
natural thing to do” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We
combined the items into an index of voluntary tax compliance.
We used a 5-item scale from Kirchler and Wahl (2010)
to measure enforced tax compliance. Item examples (preceded
by the stem “When I pay my taxes as required by the
Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so. . .”) are “. . .because
I know that I will be audited” and “. . .because the punishments
for tax evasion are very severe” (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). We combined the items into an index of
enforced tax compliance.
Results
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, Cronbach alpha
coefficients, and correlations between the study variables.
Before testing our hypothesis, we conducted confirmatory
factor analyses (CFA; Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Bandalos and
Finney, 2001). First, we estimated a 1-factor model. Next, we
estimated a 5-factor model (voluntary tax compliance, enforced
tax compliance, distributive justice, procedural justice, and
power). Finally, we fitted a 6-factor model, which was identical to
the 5-factor model, apart from the inclusion of a method factor
that was uncorrelated to the other five factors (see Podsakoff
et al., 2003). As fit indices we used the CFI, RMSEA, and PCFI.
The fit of the 1-factor model was insufficient [χ2(325) = 2309.79,
CFI = 0.52, RMSEA = 0.15 (90% CI = 0.144–0.156), PCFI = 0.48].
The fit of the 5-factor model was acceptable [χ2(318) = 642.74,
CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.061 (90% CI = 0.054–0.068), PCFI = 0.83]
after allowing the error terms of item 1 and 2 of the procedural
justice scale (see Appendix) to covary. This covariation of the first
two procedural justice items reflects prior research, showing that
the procedural justice scale has two components, that is, follower
control (reflecting these two items) and leader benevolence (van
Dijke and De Cremer, 2010). The 6-factor model also fitted the
data well [χ2(292) = 518.71, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.053 (90%
CI = 0.046–0.061), PCFI = 0.78]. According to CFI and RMSEA,
the fit of the 6-factor model is slightly superior to that of the 5-
factor model. Yet, the PCFI for this model is clearly lower than
for the 5-factor model and, in fact, below the accepted threshold
of 0.80 (Byrne, 2016). Thus, the CFAs support the validity of our
specified measurement model. In fact, even if we accept the weak
evidence for common method variance from the 6-factor model,
this does not preclude the testing of our hypothesis, as it concerns
an interaction effect, in which common method variance plays no
explanatory role (Evans, 1985).
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TABLE 1 | Study 1 variables’ means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities.
Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Gender 0.12 (0.33)
(2) Age range 1.79 (0.80) −0.18∗∗
(3) Education 4.42 (0.71) −0.00 0.50∗∗
(4) Annual income 2.75 (1.68) −0.12 0.40∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(5) Years of experience 3.15 (1.06) −0.17∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(6) Distributive justice 3.10 (1.18) 0.01 0.10 0.08 −0.05 0.11 0.70
(7) Procedural justice 3.78 (1.43) −0.01 0.01 0.04 −0.12∗ 0.02 0.34∗∗ 0.93
(8) Authority power 3.77 (1.34) 0.03 −0.01 0.08 −0.07 −0.04 0.54∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.87
(9) Enforced tax compliance 3.53 (1.48) −0.01 −0.07 −0.11 −0.05 −0.08 0.20∗∗ 0.08 0.03 0.80
(10) Voluntary tax compliance 4.82 (1.49) −0.03 0.01 0.04 −0.09 −0.03 0.45∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.22∗∗ −0.01 0.90
N = 273. Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α coefficients) are on the main diagonal for multi-item scales. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
We tested our hypothesis with ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression analyses. We entered the main effects of the predictor
variables in Step 1. In step 2 we entered the two-way interactions
between these variables. In Step 3 we entered the three-
way interaction between these variables. (We standardize the
predictor variables before calculating the interaction terms.) The
results are presented in Table 2.
As shown in Table 2, consistent with prior findings,
distributive and procedural justice, significantly predicted
voluntary tax compliance; the main effect of authority power on
voluntary tax compliance was not significant. The Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction was marginally
significant on voluntary tax compliance (p = 0.06).
In line with our hypothesis, in step 3, the three-way interaction
between procedural justice, distributive justice, and power was
significant. This interaction is depicted in Figures 1, 2. We used
simple slopes analyses to decompose this interaction (Aiken and
West, 1991). We conducted these analyses using the PROCESS
macro for SPSS (Model 3; Hayes, 2012). These analyses revealed
that the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction
significantly predicted voluntary tax compliance when the tax
authority’s power was high (1 SD above the mean; β = −0.35,
t = −2.77, p = 0.01) but not when it was low (1 SD below the
mean; β = 0.002, t = 0.02, p = 0.99).
Because the two-way Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction was significantly related to voluntary tax compliance
when authority power was high, we subsequently conducted
simple slopes tests of the simple main effects. These analyses
revealed that when authority power was high (1 SD above
the mean) and procedural justice was low (1 SD below the
mean), distributive justice significantly predicted voluntary tax
compliance (β = 0.44, t = 4.67, p < 0.01). When power was high
TABLE 2 | Regression results of study 1.
Dependent variable Voluntary tax compliance Enforced tax compliance
Step 1, R2, R2adj 0.28∗∗∗, 0.27∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗, 0.04∗∗
Distributive justice 0.30(5.50)∗∗∗ 0.01(0.16)
Procedural justice 0.34(5.29)∗∗∗ 0.25(3.33)∗∗
Authority power −0.004(− 0.06) −0.10(− 1.46)
Step 2, R2, R2adj , R2change 0.29, 0.27, 0.01 0.06, 0.03, 0.01
Distributive justice 0.31(5.54)∗∗∗ 0.002(0.03)
Procedural justice 0.33(4.87)∗∗∗ 0.27(3.57)∗∗∗
Authority power −0.003(− 0.05) −0.11(− 1.53)
Distributive justice × Procedural justice −0.09(− 1.37) 0.12(1.57)
Distributive justice × Authority power 0.05(0.81) −0.07(− 0.92)
Procedural justice × Authority power 0.05(0.90) −0.02(− 0.38)
Step 3, R2, R2adj , R2change 0.30∗, 0.29∗, 0.02∗ 0.06, 0.03, 0.001
Procedural justice 0.31(4.62)∗∗∗ 0.27(3.49)∗∗
Distributive justice 0.39(6.14)∗∗∗ 0.02(0.24)
Authority power 0.04(0.55) −0.10(− 1.38)
Distributive justice × Procedural justice −0.12(− 1.88) 0.11(1.44)
Distributive justice × Authority power 0.06(0.94) −0.07(− 0.89)
Procedural justice × Authority power 0.02(0.31) −0.03(− 0.48)
Distributive justice × Procedural justice × Authority power −0.16(− 2.55)∗ −0.03(− 0.46)
N = 273; Table presents standardized β coefficients and t-values in brackets; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 1 | The significant distributive justice × procedural justice interaction effect on voluntary tax compliance when authority power is high (Study 1).
FIGURE 2 | The non-significant distributive justice × procedural justice interaction effect on voluntary tax compliance when authority power is low (Study 1).
(1 SD above the mean) and procedural justice was high (1 SD
above the mean), distributive justice also significantly predicted
voluntary tax compliance, but the relationship was clearly weaker
(β = 0.20, t = 2.27, p = 0.02).
However, our argument implies that when the tax authority’s
power is high, high procedural or high distributive justice is
sufficient to produce high levels of voluntary tax compliance.
Figure 1 appears to be in line with this predicted pattern.
To formally test this pattern, we tested the simple slopes of
procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance when distributive
justice was high (vs. low) and when the tax authority’s power
was high (vs. low). These analyses showed that the tax authority’s
power was high (1 SD above the mean) and distributive justice
was low (1 SD below the mean), procedural justice significantly
predicted voluntary tax compliance (β = 0.56, t = 5.40, p< 0.01).
When authority power was high (1 SD above the mean) and
distributive justice was high (1 SD above the mean), procedural
justice did not significantly predict voluntary tax compliance was
not significant (β = 0.09, t = 0.62, p = 0.53).
These results indicate that procedural justice and distributive
justice interact to predict voluntary tax compliance, such that
for high voluntary tax compliance it is enough that procedural
or distributive justice is high. But this interaction is restricted
to citizens who view the tax authority as having high power.
In further evidence of our argument, Table 2 also shows that
distributive justice, procedural justice, and the tax authority’s
power did not interact to predict enforced tax compliance.
Discussion
Study 1 presents first evidence in support of our hypothesis.
However, we collected the data in one specific tax climate,
that is, among Ethiopian taxpayers. Ethiopia is characterized
by a tense connection between the tax authority and taxpayers
(Bekana et al., 2014; Gobena and van Dijke, 2016). To test
the generalizability of our findings, in Study 2 we sought to
replicate our findings obtained in the Ethiopian context in a
taxation climate where the relationship between taxpayers and
the tax authority is friendlier, that is, among United States
income taxpayers.
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Study 2
Method
We used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) to recruit
participants. AMT offers online access to a large pool of
respondents, which makes data collection faster and inexpensive
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). AMT is widely used to gather data
across a wide range of the social sciences (Buhrmester et al., 2011;
Goodman, 2013). Studies that have employed AMT cover topics
as diverse as procedural justice (van Dijke et al., 2015) and acting
professionally (Uhlmann et al., 2013). Previous tax compliance
research has also relied on AMT to collect data (Gobena and
van Dijke, 2017). The reliability of data collected via AMT for
both survey and experimental studies mirrors (and sometimes is
even superior to) that of data obtained using traditional methods
(Behrend et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013; Holden et al., 2013;
Bartneck, 2015).
Sample and procedure
We invited respondents who currently had work that earned
them taxable income and hence had experience with the tax
authority to participate in the study. There were no missing
values because all 248 respondents that we recruited for the study
responded to all items. The data is available as Supplementary
Material. We informed respondents that the study was being
about “individuals’ interactions with authorities.” Of the 248
respondents, 48% were male, and 52% were female. Thirty
percent were between 20 and 30 years of age, 30% between
31 and 40, 18% between 41 and 50, 12% between 51 and 60,
and 10% above 60 years of age. Twenty-four percent had a
high school diploma, 15% had completed vocational education,
46% had a bachelor’s degree, 10% had completed a master’s
degree, and 4% had completed a Ph.D. Eighteen percent the
respondents earned annually less than 20,000 USD, 13% earned
between 20,000 and 29,999 USD, 20% earned between 30,000
and 39,999 USD, 13% earned between 40,000 and 49,999
USD, and 36% earned 50,000 USD or more. Six percent of
respondents had fewer than 2 years of experience with the
tax authority; 17% had between 2 and 6 years of experience;
14% had between 6 and 10 years; 27% had between 10 and
20 years; and 36% had more than 20 years of experience. Eighty-
eight percent identified themselves as White/Caucasian, 4% as
Hispanic American, 4% as African American, 2% as Asian
American, 1% as Native American, and 1% as having an “other”
ethnic background.
Measures
We measured all study variables (i.e., procedural justice,
distributive justice, authority power, and voluntary tax
compliance) with the same instruments as in Study 1 (see
Appendix), except for some wording changes in which
“Ethiopia” was replaced by “the United States.” All variables
were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree).
Results
Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients, and correlations between the study variables.
Like in Study 1, we conducted CFAs. The 1-factor model
showed insufficient fit [χ2(325) = 2543.84, CFI = 0.49,
RMSEA = 0.166 (90% CI = 0.160–0.172), PCFI = 0.45]. The 5-
factor model showed acceptable fit [χ2(318) = 774.42, CFI = 0.90,
RMSEA = 0.076 (90% CI = 0.069–0.083), PCFI = 0.81],
when the error terms of item 1 and 2 of the procedural
justice scale were allowed to covary. The 6-factor model
also showed acceptable fit [χ2(292) = 650.98, CFI = 0.92,
RMSEA = 0.071 (90% CI = 0.063–0.078), PCFI = 0.76].
Thus, as in Study 1, although the CFI and RMSEA indicate
a marginally better fit for the 6-factor model, the PCFI for
of this model was lower than for the 5-factor model. It
was also below the accepted threshold of 0.80. In sum, the
CFAs in this study also support the validity of our specified
measurement model.
We tested our hypothesis using OLS regression, as we did
in Study 1. We entered the main effects of distributive justice,
procedural justice, and authority power, and their interactions,
in the same way as we did in Study 1. The results are presented
in Table 4.
As shown in Table 4, consistent with Study 1, distributive
and procedural justice significantly predicted voluntary tax
TABLE 3 | Study 2 variables’ means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities.
Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
(1) Gender 0.52 (0.50)
(2) Age range 2.41 (1.29) 0.71
(3) Education 3.54 (1.11) −0.08 −0.02
(4) Annual income 3.37 (1.52) −0.42 0.15∗ 0.27∗∗
(5) Years of experience 3.70 (1.27) 0.01 0.71∗∗ 0.07 0.25∗∗
(6) Distributive justice 3.14 (1.20) 0.02 −0.13∗ 0.11 −0.09 −0.15∗ 0.76
(7) Procedural Justice 3.85 (1.38) 0.01 −0.14∗ 0.05 −0.06 −0.16∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.93
(8) Authority power 3.85 (1.37) 0.15∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.06 −0.21∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.89
(9) Enforced tax
compliance
4.11 (1.40) 0.06 −0.09 −0.08 0.08 −0.16∗ −0.04 −0.26∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.84
(10) Voluntary tax
compliance
4.83 (1.50) 0.14∗ 0.03 0.10 −0.08 −0.01 0.54∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.24∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.17∗∗ 0.90
N = 248. Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α coefficients) are on the main diagonal for multi-item scales. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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TABLE 4 | Regression results of study 2.
Dependent variable Voluntary tax compliance Enforced tax compliance
Step 1, R2, R2adj 0.36∗∗∗, 0.35∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗, 0.12∗∗∗
Distributive justice 0.29(5.05)∗∗∗ −0.29(− 4.30)∗∗∗
Procedural justice 0.43(6.47)∗∗∗ −0.06(− 0.81)
Authority power −0.05(− 0.79) 0.28(3.94)∗∗∗
Step 2, R2, R2adj, R2change 0.36, 0.35, 0.01 0.14, 0.12, 0.01
Distributive justice 0.30(5.13)∗∗∗ −0.28(− 4.10)∗∗∗
Procedural justice 0.41(5.90)∗∗∗ −0.06(− 0.69)
Authority power −0.04(− 0.60) 0.28(3.84)∗∗∗
Distributive justice × Procedural justice −0.08(− 1.14) 0.06(0.72)
Distributive justice × Authority power 0.09(1.25) 0.02(0.25)
Procedural justice × Authority power −0.02(− 0.37) −0.03(− 0.44)
Step 3, R2, R2adj, R2change 0.37∗, 0.36∗, 0.01∗ 0.15, 0.12, 0.01
Distributive justice 0.36(5.59)∗∗∗ −0.22(− 2.97)∗∗
Procedural justice 0.40(5.83)∗∗∗ −0.06(− 0.77)
Power 0.00(− 0.01) 0.31(4.16)∗∗∗
Distributive justice × Procedural justice −0.09(− 1.36) 0.04(0.55)
Distributive justice × Authority power 0.09(1.36) 0.03(0.33)
Procedural justice × Authority power −0.02(− 0.39) −0.03(− 0.45)
Distributive justice × Procedural justice × Authority power −0.13(− 2.16)∗ −0.12(− 1.68)
N = 248; Table presents standardized β coefficients and t-values in brackets; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
compliance; the main effect of authority power did not
significantly predict voluntary tax compliance. Furthermore, the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction was not
significant (p = 0.22), although it was in the expected direction.
Similar to Study 1, in support of our hypothesis, the
three-way interaction between distributive justice, procedural
justice, and the authority’s power was significant. Figures 3, 4
visually depict the shape of this interaction. We proceeded
to decompose this interaction with simple slopes analyses
(Aiken and West, 1991), again using the PROCESS macro
for SPSS (model 3; Hayes, 2012). These analyses showed
that when the authority’s power was high (1 SD above
the mean), the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction significantly predicted voluntary tax compliance
(β = −0.18, t = −2.19, p = 0.03). However, when the
authority’s power was low (1 SD below the mean), the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction did not
significantly predict voluntary tax compliance (β = −0.003,
t = −0.04, p = 0.97).
Because the simple Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction significantly predicted voluntary tax compliance
among citizens who perceived the tax authority to wield high
power but not among those who perceived the tax authority
to wield low power, we proceeded, as in Study 1, with further
simple slopes tests in which we decomposed the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction among citizens who
perceived the tax authority to wield high power. These analyses
revealed that when the authority had high power (1 SD above
the mean) and procedural justice was low (1 SD below the
mean), distributive justice significantly predicted voluntary tax
compliance (β = 0.61, t = 4.06, p < 0.01). When authority
power was high (1 SD above the mean) and procedural justice
was high (1 SD above the mean), distributive justice did
not significantly predict voluntary tax compliance (β = 0.28,
t = 3.19, p< 0.01).
As stated earlier, our argument implies that when power of the
tax authority is high, high procedural or high distributive justice
is enough to produce high levels of voluntary tax compliance.
Similar to Figures 1, 2 appears to be in line with this predicted
pattern. To formally test this pattern, we tested the simple
slopes of procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance when
distributive justice was high (vs. low), and when the power of
the tax authority was perceived to be high (vs. low). These
analyses revealed that when authority power was high (1 SD
above the mean) and distributive justice was low (1 SD below the
mean), procedural justice significantly predicted voluntary tax
compliance (β = 0.55, t = 5.18, p < 0.01). When authority power
was high (1 SD above the mean) and distributive justice was high
(1 SD above the mean), procedural justice marginally significantly
predicted voluntary tax compliance (β = 0.22, t = 1.71, p = 0.09).
As in Study 1, these results show that voluntary tax compliance
is predicted by the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction, such that for high voluntary tax compliance, it is
enough that distributive or procedural justice is high. But the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction is restricted
to citizens who perceive the tax authority’s power as high
(rather than low). Furthermore, distributive justice, procedural
justice, and the tax authority’s power did not interact to predict
enforced tax compliance.
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
The Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction
marginally predicted voluntary tax compliance in Study 1
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FIGURE 3 | The significant distributive justice × procedural justice interaction effect on voluntary tax compliance when authority power is high (Study 2).
FIGURE 4 | The non-significant distributive justice × procedural justice interaction effect on voluntary tax compliance when authority power is low (Study 2).
and non-significantly in Study 2. To assess if this interaction
significantly predicts voluntary tax compliance across the
two studies, we conducted a within-paper meta-analysis
using MAVIS in the R Shiny package for R. We weighted
the study effect sizes by the inverse variance and used
the DerSimonian-Laird estimator for tau2 and Fisher’s z
transformation of the correlations (i.e., derived from the β
coefficients of the interaction; Hamilton et al., 2016). This
analysis showed that across Studies 1–2 the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction significantly predicted
voluntary tax compliance (r = −0.12; 95% CI [−0.21;−0.04],
z = −2.79, p = 0.01).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
One important dilemma that individuals face is whether to
comply with tax laws and regulations, where the personal gains
that result from non-compliance come at a cost for society
and its members. We tested in an Ethiopian (Study 1) and
United States (Study 2) sample of income taxpayers if the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction (i.e., high
distributive or high procedural justice being enough to produce
voluntary compliance) is restricted to tax authorities with high
(vs. low) power. We obtained this predicted three-way interaction
only on voluntary, and not on enforced, tax compliance.
Theoretical Implications
It has been argued that the Distributive Justice × Procedural
Justice interaction, where high distributive or high procedural
justice is enough to produce cooperative responses, results from
concerns to assess whether one will be the victim of power
abuse by the enacting authority. Based on this argument,
we expected that the Distributive Justice × Procedural
Justice interaction materializes in particular when the
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enacting authority’s power is high (vs. low). We expected
this because in such situations, citizens are relatively likely
to fear abuse. Previous work has shown that the typically
observed Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction
where high distributive or high procedural justice is enough
to produce cooperative responses, is not found when the
person enacting procedural and distributive justice is of
lower rank than the person on the receiving end of justice
(Chen et al., 2003; Blader and Chen, 2011). However, it is
not clear whether this effect resulted from fear of power
abuse or from another process because rank differences
can be based on a number of variables besides power,
most notably status. And status is only modestly related
with power (Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Anderson and
Brown, 2010). Thus, our research adds to this prior work
by offering a direct test of the idea that the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction pattern results from
concerns about power abuse by authorities. Moreover, our
design allows leaving the typical situation intact where
justice is enacted by an authority of higher rank, such as
the relationship between taxpayers and the tax authority,
but also relationships between managers and employees
at the work floor. In sum, identifying authority power as
a novel, theoretically relevant boundary condition to the
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice interaction helps
us understand better when and also why these two types of
justice interact.
Furthermore, our cross-cultural studies with two samples
that strongly differ in terms of tax climates serve the purpose
of filling the void in studies that compare the voluntary tax
compliance behavior of developed and developing countries
(Gobena and van Dijke, 2016). Our study uniquely explores
how social psychological and deterrent factors moderate
each other in stimulating voluntary tax compliance across
culturally different samples – one in Ethiopia and the other
in the United States. Accordingly, we contribute to the
ecological validity of integrative roles of social psychological
and deterrence factors on tax compliance. Deterrent factors
are those factors that force individuals to behave against their
will; one of such factors is power wielded by authorities
(Kirchler et al., 2008; Kastlunger et al., 2013). Deterrent
factors belong to a distinct stream of research on tax
compliance behavior that presumes that taxpayers’ compliance
with taxation laws and rules depends on their self-interest and
consequent comparison of the costs and benefits of evading
taxes (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). The deterrent line of
research is based on the notion that taxpayers are selfish
and will decide to pay taxes only when they believe the
expected costs of evading taxes (i.e., tax audits and subsequent
punishments) outweigh the benefits of evasion (i.e., money saved
from unpaid taxes).
Practical Implications
This research also offers contributions to the practice of tax
administration. First, prior research has identified procedural
and distributive justice as important antecedents of voluntary
tax compliance (e.g., Wenzel, 2003; Saad, 2011). Unfortunately,
taxpayers often perceive distributive justice as low, owing,
for example, to the judgment of their exchange with the
government as unfair, inequitable distribution of tax burdens
and benefits, or simply because they view paying taxes as
unfavorable, which taints distributive justice perceptions.
We showed, however, that high (vs. low) procedural
justice of the tax authorities buffers the effects of lowered
perceived distributive justice. Therefore, tax authorities
can stimulate a higher level of voluntary tax compliance
by making their decision-making procedures free of their
own self-interest, basing taxation decisions on accurate
information, and letting the taxpayers voice their opinions
in the decisions.
From a different vantage point, high (vs. low) distributive
justice buffers the relationship between lowered procedural
justice and voluntary tax compliance. This is also relevant to
consider because it may often not be possible, for instance, to
offer voice to taxpayers in taxation decisions, or to convince
taxpayers that the tax authority used all relevant information to
arrive at a decision. In such situations, high distributive justice is
important to stimulate high levels of voluntary tax compliance.
However, our results also show that for either justice
dimension to buffer effects of low scores on the other dimension,
it is important to be also perceived as having high power
(i.e., being capable of detecting and punishing non-compliance).
Thus, even in antagonistic taxation climates, tax authorities are
advised to gradually build power by increasing the percentage
of tax evasion they detect and having convincing knowledge and
competence to detect tax evasion.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future
Research
One limitation that should be discussed results concerns the
fact that it is not possible to arrive at causal conclusions, due
to the cross-sectional design that we used. Future research
should draw unambiguous causal conclusions using longitudinal
or experimental designs. Yet, we note that prior experimental
research has shown that high (vs. low) procedural justice
increases voluntary tax compliance (e.g., Wenzel, 2006; Doyle
et al., 2009; van Dijke and Verboon, 2010). Furthermore,
various experiments have identified the interactive effect of
procedural and distributive justice on various outcomes that are
related to compliance, such as voluntary cooperation in groups
(Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Another limitation is that we studied voluntary tax
compliance (rather than actual levels of compliance) based
on self-reported data. The use of self-reported measures in the
tax compliance literature is common because it is very difficult
to obtain tax compliance data from other sources (e.g., Wahl
et al., 2010; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Gobena and van Dijke,
2016; Siglé et al., 2018). Moreover, one important limitation of
objective tax compliance data is that it cannot detect various
types of motives that underlie compliance; something that was
of primary interest in our research (cf. van Dijke and Verboon,
2010). It should be noted that a number of studies found
that self-reported compliance significantly predicts objective
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compliance (see e.g., Tittle, 1980; Hite, 1988; but see also
Hessing et al., 1988).
Our measure of distributive justice (taken from Verboon
and van Dijke, 2007) combines three elements of distributive
justice that are in the literature sometimes more explicitly
distinguished, specifically, horizontal equity, vertical equity,
and exchange equity. Exchange equity refers to “the perceived
value of tax-funded government benefits and services received
relative to one’s tax contribution” (Wenzel, 2003, p. 44). This
element is well-captured in several items that we used (see
Appendix) including “The use I make of all kinds of social
services reflects in a proper way the taxes I pay.” Vertical
equity describes “the burden of taxes for certain social strata
relative to other strata” (Wenzel, 2003, p. 44). This distributive
justice element is most clearly reflected in the item “Some
groups in society benefit more from the tax system than
I do.” Finally, horizontal equity “concerns the burden of
taxes for members relative to others within a given social
stratum” (Wenzel, 2003, p. 44). This element of distributive
justice is most clearly reflected in the item “I think it is
not fair that some people pay less tax than me while they
benefit equally from all amenities.” Future research should use
instruments that distinguish these distributive justice elements
and test if each element interacts with procedural justice
and authority power similar to how the overall distributive
justice scale interacts with these variables. Based on distributive
justice theories such as equity theory (Adams, 1965), which
is well-supported by research, we expect similar results for
the three elements. Specifically, this theory argues that the
three distributive justice elements are related to each other
because citizens use social comparison information that is
inherent to vertical and horizontal equity as input to evaluate
exchange equity.
The measure of power that we used (taken from Kastlunger
et al., 2013), which focuses on effectively detecting tax non-
compliance, connects well with established definitions of power
in the tax compliance literature (i.e., “tax authorities’ capacity
to detect and punish tax crimes”; Wahl et al., 2010, p. 385; see
also Kirchler et al., 2008; see Verboon and van Dijke, 2007;
Siglé et al., 2018, for similar measures of power). Kastlunger
et al. (2013) labeled this scale “legitimate power.” However, the
tax compliance literature usually takes a much broader view
of legitimate power as “based on the fact that the legitimate
authorities use information, charisma, legitimization, and
expertise to convince taxpayers that it is the right course of
action to cooperate” (Gangl et al., 2015, p. 16). Thus, one way
to view our results is that power as we measured it combined
with procedural and/or distributive justice (which involves
legitimization and offering information; Tyler, 2006) provides
an encompassing index of the legitimacy of tax authorities.
Future research should test if the three-way interaction that
we obtained on voluntary tax compliance is mediated by
legitimacy perceptions.
Finally, authority power moderated the interaction between
distributive and procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance,
but not lower-order effects of these two justice dimensions.
This is in line with the argument for the Distributive
Justice × Procedural Justice interaction that high distributive
or high procedural justice is generally sufficient to induce the
belief that the authority will not abuse his/her power. However,
van Dijke et al. (2010) found that high (vs. low) procedural
justice influenced trust in the authority and subsequent positive
responses to the authority only among employees who interacted
with an authority who was high (vs. low) in power. It
should be noted that van Dijke et al. (2010) operationalized
power different from how we did this. Specifically, they relied
on theoretically derived scales of reward power (e.g., “My
supervisor can increase my pay level”) and coercive power
(“My supervisor can give me undesirable job assignments”;
Hinkin and Schriesheim, 1989). Kastlunger et al. (2013) also
developed a coercive power scale in the tax compliance context.
This scale does not refer to power based upon the ability to
reward or punish citizens, but to perceptions of authorities
as being negative or hostile in their orientation toward tax
payers (e.g., “Tax authorities primarily aim to punish” and
“Tax authorities nurture hostile feelings toward taxpayers”).
Given this focus, we decided not to use this scale in our
research (but see Gobena and van Dijke, 2016, for evidence
that Kastlunger et al.’s (2013) legitimate and coercive power
scales interact with procedural justice to predict voluntary tax
compliance among business owners). Future research should
test if operationalizations of power other than the one that
we used moderate the Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice
interaction and lower-order effects of procedural and distributive
justice on voluntary tax compliance.
CONCLUSION
Distributive and procedural justice and justice have both been
identified as factors that enhance voluntary tax compliance.
We focused on the interactive effect of these two types of
justice on voluntary tax compliance, identifying power of the
tax authority as a boundary moderator of the interactive
relationship. In taking this approach, we show that fair
procedures can make up for the perception of unfair outcomes,
as long as the tax authority’s power is high. Integrating these
diverse factors that promote voluntary tax compliance in two
extremely divergent tax climates has thus relevant theoretical and
practical implications.
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APPENDIX
Below is a list of two of the measures used in this paper. All responses were on a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,
3 = moderately disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree).
Procedural Justice (Taken From Gobena and van Dijke, 2016, Who Adapted the Scale
From Colquitt, 2001)
“The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at tax-related decisions.
(1) I have been able to express my views and feelings during those procedures.
(2) I have had influence over the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures.
(3) Those procedures have been applied consistently.
(4) Those procedures have been free of bias.
(5) Those procedures have been based on accurate information.
(6) I have been able to appeal the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures.
(7) Those procedures have upheld ethical and moral standards.”
Distributive Justice (Verboon and van Dijke, 2007)
(1) “The use I make of all kinds of social services reflects in a proper way the taxes I pay.
(2) Regarding social services I get little return for my tax money; reverse coded.
(3) Some groups in society benefit more from the tax system than I do; reverse coded.
(4) I think it is not fair that some people pay less tax than me while they benefit equally from all amenities; reverse coded.
(5) I find that I have to pay too much tax; reverse coded.”
Power of Tax Authority (Kastlunger et al., 2013)
(1) “Tax evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases.
(2) Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way.
(3) Tax evasion is likely to be detected.
(4) Tax authorities control frequently and profoundly.
(5) Due to their knowledge and competence, tax authorities are able to detect quite every act of tax evasion.”
Voluntary Tax Compliance (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010)
“When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so. . .
(1) . . .because to me it’s obvious that this is what you do.
(2) . . . to support the state and other citizens.
(3) . . . because I like to contribute to everyone’s good.
(4) . . . because for me it’s the natural thing to do.
(5) . . . because I regard it as my duty as a citizen.”
Enforced Tax Compliance (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010)
“When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so. . ..
(1) . . .because a great many tax audits are carried out.
(2) . . . because the tax authority often carries out audits.
(3) . . . because I know that I will be audited.
(4) . . . because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe.
(5) . . . because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes without attracting attention.”
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